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Deliberation plays an important role in the 
design of rational agents embedded in the 
real-world. In particular, deliberation leads 
to the formation of intentions, i.e., plans of 
action that the agent is committed to achiev­
ing. In this paper, we present a branching­
time possible-worlds model for representing 
and reasoning about, beliefs, goals, inten­
tions, time, actions, probabilities, and pay­
offs. We compare this possible-worlds ap­
proach with the more traditional decision­
tree representation and provide a transfor­
mation from decision trees to possible worlds. 
Finally, we illustrate how an agent can per­
form deliberation using a decision-tree rep­
resentation and then use a possible-worlds 
model to form and reason about his inten­
tions. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The design of rational agents, situated in a dynamic 
world and operating effectively under real-time con­
straints and resource limitations, has been of great 
interest to researchers in philosophy, artificial intel­
ligence, and computer science [1, 2, 7]. Such ratio­
nal agents have to balance the time taken thinking 
against the time needed for acting. In particular, they 
must balance the frequency of reassessment of options 
against continuing commitment to previously chosen 
plans. 
Classical planning addresses only one aspect of the 
above problem; namely, means-end reasoning. Means­
end reasoning involves finding a sequence of actions 
that satisfy a certain end goal (or goals). However, 
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simplifying assumptions are made about the capabili­
ties of the reasoning agents and the worlds they occupy 
that limit the use of these techniques to essentially 
static domains. 
Classical decision theory, on the other hand, addresses 
the problem of weighing alternative courses of action 
and choosing the best plan of action according to some 
well-defined criteria, such as maximizing expected util­
ity. However, this theory presupposes an ideal agent 
who can consider and weigh all possible alternative 
courses of action before making a decision. In real sit­
uations, such an assumption is rarely valid-not only 
does the world undergo continuous change, even as the 
agent is deliberating, but the agent may not be capable 
of enumerating all the alternatives. 
What is required for the design of rational agents 
is a combination of symbolic means-end reasoning 
and numeric decision-theoretic analysis that takes into 
account the resource-boundedness of rational agents 
[6]. One such design is provided by the belief-desire­
intention (BDI) architecture [2]. This architecture 
gives primary importance to the attitude of intentions. 
While most philosophical accounts of rational agency 
treat intentions as being reducible to beliefs and de­
sires, Bratman [1] argues convincingly that intentions, 
especially future-directed intentions, play a significant 
and distinct role in resource-bounded reasoning. 
Bratman treats intentions as plans of action that the 
agent is committed to achieving. Prior intentions con­
strain the search for possible means for achieving the 
current intention and thus focus the means-end reason­
ing process. The notion of commitment, which lends 
a certain sense of stability to means-end reasoning, is 
balanced against the notion of reconsideration of inten­
tions, which lends a certain sense of reactivity. This 
rational balance between commitment and reconsider­
ation is essential for effective means-end reasoning in 
dynamic domains.1 
1 Some interesting experimental work has recently been 
done in this area [11]. 
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Intentions play two important roles in resource­
bounded decision-theoretic analysis or deliberation [1). 
First, prior intentions pose problems for further de­
liberation, i.e., prior intentions produce the decision 
problems that the agent needs to consider. Second, 
prior intentions constrain the deliberation process be­
cause they rule out options that conflict with existing 
intentions. Under this view, the deliberation process 
is a continuous resource-bounded activity rather than 
a one-off exhaustive decision-theoretic analysis. 
So far, we have discussed the role of intentions in 
means-ends reasoning and deliberation. However, we 
have not discussed how the agent arrives at his in­
tentions. Prior intentions, means-ends reasoning, and 
deliberation are all involved in the formation of in­
tentions. By means-ends reasoning, a prior intention 
towards an end results in the agent enumerating all the 
alternative or means of achieving this end; the agent 
by deliberating on all these alternatives then chooses 
the best one and commits to it by forming an intention. 
We have previously provided (14, 15) a logical frame­
work that describes the role of intentions in means-end 
reasoning. In this paper, we illustrate how the process 
of deliberation can lead to the formation of intentions. 
2 O VERVIEW 
BDI-architectures are formalized by defining notions 
such as beliefs, goals, intentions, actions, and the 
inter-relationships between them. We have previ­
ously shown how this can be accomplished using a 
branching-time possible-worlds logic (15). 
Briefly, the structure of our logic is as follows: Each 
world is a temporal structure with a branching time fu­
ture and a single past called a time tree (4). A particu­
lar time point in a particular world is called a situation. 
Event types transform one time point into another. 
For each situation we associate a set of belief-accessible, 
goal-accessible, and intention-accessible worlds; intu­
itively, those worlds that the agent believes to be pos­
sible, desires to bring about, and commits to achiev­
ing, respectively. Multiple possible worlds result from 
the agent's lack of knowledge about the state of the 
world. But within each of these possible worlds, the 
branching future represents the choice of actions avail­
able to the agent. Moving from belief to goal to inten­
tion worlds amounts to successively pruning the paths 
of the time tree; intuitively, to making increasingly 
selective choices about one's future actions. This is 
captured semantically by requiring that for each belief­
accessible world there exists a sub-world which is goal­
accessible and, in turn, for each goal-accessible world 
there exists a sub-world which is intention-accessible 
(see Figure 1). 
In this paper, we extend the expressive power of the 
above logic to model the process of deliberation by 
introducing subjective probabilities and subjective pay­
offs. For the former, we adopt the formalism of Fa­
gin and Halpern (5) and extend it to a branching­
time model. For the latter, we introduce a payoff 
function that associates numeric values (or payoffs) 
with certain paths in a time tree. Intuitively, an 
agent at each situation has a probability distribution 
on his belief-accessible worlds. He then chooses sub­
worlds of these that he considers are worth pursu­
ing and associates a payoff value with each path in 
these sub-worlds. These sub-worlds are considered to 
be the agent's goal-accessible worlds. By making use 
of the probability distribution on his belief-accessible 
worlds and the payoff distribution on the paths in his 
goal-accessible worlds, the agent determines the best 
plan(s) of action for different scenarios. This process 
will be called Possible- Worlds(P W) deliberation. The 
result of PW-deliberation is a set of sub-worlds of the 
goal-accessible worlds; namely, the ones that the agent 
considers best. These sub-worlds are taken to be the 
intention-accessible worlds that the agent commits to 
achieving. 
In contrast to this approach, decision theory represents 
the problem as a decision tree (or, equivalently, as a 
payoff matrix or influence diagram). A decision tree 
consists of three types of nodes: (a) decision nodes, 
which represent the choice of actions; (b) chance nodes, 
which represent the state of uncertainty in the world; 
and (c) terminal nodes, which represent the value of 
outcomes. Based on the category of decision making 
- namely, certainty, risk or uncertainty - a particular 
decision rule is adopted for selecting the best plan(s) 
of action. We shall refer to this process as decision-tree 
(DT) deliberation. 
The main thrust of this paper is to show how decision­
tree deliberation can be utilized within a framework 
that is suited to resource-bounded reasoning in dy­
namic domains. We first describe the possible-worlds 
model and the decision tree representation formally. 
We then provide a transformation from decision trees 
to the possible-worlds model. From the possible 
worlds viewpoint, this provides a concrete method 
for obtaining the probability and payoff distribution 
on the worlds. From a decision theory viewpoint, 
the transformation facilitates symbolic manipulation 
of decision-theoretic entities. Finally, we describe clas­
sical decision-tree deliberation and show how it can be 
used to determine the formation of intentions. 
3 POSSIBLE WORLDS MODEL 
In our earlier work (15) we extended the propositional 
branching-time logic CTL • (4) to a possible-worlds 
framework and introduced modal operators for beliefs, 
goals, and intentions. In this section, we enhance this 
logic by introducing operators for probability (similar 
to that of Fagin and Halpern (5]) and payoffs. 
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3.1 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 
Similar to CTL •, we have two types of formulas in our 
logic: state formulas (which are true in a specific world 
at a particular time point) and path formulas (which 
are true along a specific path). A state formula is 
defined as follows: (a) any propositional formula is a 
state formula; (b) if <h, . . .  , c/Jk are state formulas, 1/J1, 
. .. , 1/Jk are path formulas, and 01, ... , Ok, a are real 
numbers, then 01PROB(¢I) + . . .  + OkPROB(</>k) � 
a and 01 PAYOFF( 1/;1) + . . .  + Ok PAYOFF( 1/Jk) � a are 
also state formulas; (c) if ¢1 and <1>2 are state formulas, 
and 1/J is a path formula, then -,4>1, ¢1 V ¢2, BEL(¢!), 
GOAL(¢!), lNTEND(</>I) and OPTIONAL(l/;) are state 
formulas. A path formula can be defined as follows: 
(a) any state formula is a path formula; (b) if e is an 
event type then done( e) is a path formula; (c) ifl/;1 and 
1/;2 are path formulas, then ..,1/;1, 1/J1 V 1/;2, and Ol/;1, 
are path formulas. Event types include primitive event 
types, e1;e2, and?¢. 
We now define formally the notion of an interpretation 
in our language. 
Definition 1 : An interpretation M = <W, E, T, 
-<, B, 9, I, PA, OA, <1>>. W is a set of worlds, E 
is a set of primitive event types, T is a set of time 
points, -< a binary relation on time points, 2 and <I> 
is a truth assignment of primitive propositions for any 
given world and time point. A situation is a world, say 
w, at a particular time point, say t, and is denoted by 
w,. The relations, B, 9, and I map the agent's current 
situation to her belief, goal, and intention-accessible 
worlds, respectively. More formally, B � W x T x 
W and similarly for 9 and I. PA is a probability 
assignment function that assigns to each time point 
t and world w a probability function 11r . Each 11r 
is a discrete probability function on the set of worlds 
W. OA is a payoff assignment function that assigns to 
each time point t and world w a payoff function p'f. 
Each p'f is a partial mapping from paths to real-valued 
numbers. 
Definition 2 : Each world w of W is a tuple <Tw, 
Aw, Ow>, where Tw � T, Aw � Tw X Tw , and Ow: 
Tw X Tw >--+ E. Intuitively, Ow is an arc function that 
is a partial mapping from time points to an event and 
signifies the occurrence of an event. Also, Aw obeys 
the ordering of -(. Such worlds are called time trees. 
A fullpath in a world w is an infinite sequence of time 
points (to, tJ, ... ) such that Vi (t;, ti+l) E Aw. We 
use the notation ( w,0, w,, ... ) to make the world of a 
particular fullpath explicit. 
The semantics of the language with interpretation M 
is as follows: 
2We require that the binary relation be total, transitive 
and backward-linear to enforce a single past and branching 
future. 
M, Wt0 F PROB(¢) �a iff 
11:';. ( { w' E 8:';, I M, w' to F 4>}) � a 
M, Wt0 F PAYOFF(l/;) �a iff 
\fw' E 9;" and Vx; such that M, x; f: 1/;, 
where x; is a fullpath (w',0, w',.,, . . .  ), 
it is the case that pf. ( x;) � a 
M, Wt0 F OPTIONAL(l/;) iff 
there exists a full path in w, ( w,0, w,, , . . .  ) 
such that M, (w,0, w,, . . .  ) F 1/J 
M, Wto F R(¢) iff\/ w' E nro' we have M, w',o F </>. 
M, (w,0, w,, .. .  ) F </>iff M, Wt0 F </>. 
M, (w,0, Wt, .. .  ) F 0¢ iff 
3k, k>O such that M, (w,., . . .  ) f: 4> 
M, (w,, . . .  ) f: done(e) iff 
there exists to such that e E Ow(to, ti) 
M, (w,,, . . . ) f: done(e1;e2) iff 
there exists to such that e2 E Ow(to, t1) and 
M, (w,0, • • •  ) f: done(ei) 
M, (w,, . . .  ) f: done(?¢) iff M, w,, f: </>. 
R and 'R indicate the modal operators and relations, 
respectively, of belief, goal, and intention. We use the 
abbreviation nr to denote all the worlds 'R-accessible 
from watt. 
The semantics of temporal and modal operators is rel­
atively straightforward. The probability of a formula 
4> is greater than or equal to a if and only if the proba­
bility distribution of all the belief-accessible worlds in 
which 4> is true is greater than a. The payoff of a for­
mula 1/J is greater than or equal to a if and only if the 
payoff function assigns a value greater than or equal 
to a to all paths where 1/J is true in all goal-accessible 
worlds. 
INEVITABLE(¢) is defined as ..,OPTIONAL(..,¢); D¢ 
as ..,o..,¢. Additionally, the conditional probability 
PROB(¢1 14>2) �a can be represented as PROB(</>1 1\ 
<1>2) � a.PROB(¢2) [8]. 
We shall illustrate the belief- and goal-accessible 
worlds of an agent using a simple example. Phil, who 
is currently in the House of Representatives, believes 
that he can stand for the House of representatives 
(Rep), switch to the Senate and stand for a Senate 
seat (Sen), or retire from politics (Ret) [10]. He does 
not consider the option of retiring seriously and is sure 
to retain his House seat. He has to make a decision re­
garding conducting or not conducting an opinion poll, 
based upon which he has to decide to stand for the 
House or the Senate. The results of the poll would be 
either a majority approving his switch to the Senate 
(yes) or a majority disapproving of his switch (no). 
Consider the current situation to be w,. The four 
belief-accessible worlds of w,, shown in Figure 1, corre­
spond to Phil winning or losing the Senate seat based 
on the majority answering yes or no in the poll. The 
probabilities of these worlds are shown in the top right 
hand corner of each world. The propositions win, 
loss, yes, and no are true at the situations shown. 











































Figure 1: Belief, Goal, and Intention (wrt maxexpval) Worlds 
Some of the formulas that are satisfiable at w1 are 
BEL(OPTIONAL(<>done(Sen))), i.e., Phil believes that 
he has the option of eventually standing for the Sen­
ate, and PROB(OPTIONAL(<>yes)) = 0.42, i.e., the 
probability of eventually achieving a yes response is 
0.42. 
The goal worlds are also shown in Figure 1 (for clarity, 
we have omitted the time points, which are the same as 
in the belief worlds). The values at the end of the paths 
(100, 200, and 300) signify the value of losing a Sen­
ate seat, winning a House seat, and winning a Senate 
seat. This can be expressed as PAYOFF(<>(done(Sen) 
1\ loss))= 100, PAYOFF(<>(done(Sen) 1\ win))= 300, 
etc. Other formulas can state other properties of the 
agent's goals. For example, the goal of the agent to re­
tain his option to eventually stand for a Senate seat is 
expressed as GOAL(OPTIONAL(<>done(Sen))). Note 
that the option of retiring from politics exists only in 
belief worlds, not in goal worlds, i.e., Phil believes that 
retiring is an option, but does not have any goal to­
wards retiring. 
3.2 SEMANTIC CONDITIONS 
In this section, we give an informal description of some 
of the semantic conditions that can be imposed on our 
possible worlds model. Some of these conditions re­
quire the definition of a sub-world. We define a world 
to be a sub-world of another (denoted by �) if and only 
if the time points in one are a subset of the other, they 
share the same history, and everything else is identical. 
The formal definition of sub-worlds and the axioms 
corresponding to the following semantic conditions are 
given elsewhere [13]. 
If the belief-accessible worlds represent chance, then 
no level of introspection can change the chance. Thus 
we require that all belief-accessible worlds have identi­
cal probability distributions (Semantic Condition C1). 
We also require that the probability distribution over 
belief-accessible worlds add up to one (C2). From C2 
we also have that beliefs about inevitable facts have 
probability one. 
We introduce a constraint on our belief, goal, and 
intention-accessible worlds, called strong realism [15]. 
Strong realism requires that for every belief-accessible 
world there exists a sub-world which is a goal­
accessible world, and for every goal-accessible world 
there exists a sub-world which is an intention­
accessible world (C3). The same restriction can be 
applied in the reverse direction also (C4). These two 
conditions essentially ensure that, if the agent intends 
an option, he has the goal towards that option and 
also believes in that option. These semantic condi­
tions are very strong and have a significant impact 
on the inter-relationships between beliefs, goals, and 
intentions. We show elsewhere [14, 15] how these con­
ditions can be relaxed to solve some of the problems 
associated with possible-world representations of be­
liefs, goals, and intentions [3]. 
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More formally, the semantic conditions Cl to C4 can 
be stated as follows: 
(Cl) Vw' E Bf', pf" = p( · 
(C2) pf'(Bl") = 1. 
(C3) Vw' E Bw 3w" E gw such that w" C: w' and t t -
Vw' E 9f' 3w" E Bf' such that w" !:;;; ul. 
(C4) Vw' E gw 3w" E zw such that w" C: w' and t t -
Vw' E I/" 3w" E 9/" such that w" !:;;; w'. 
In the remainder of this paper, we shall use this 
possible-worlds BDI model as a basis for deliberation. 
4 DECISION TREES AND GOAL 
WORLDS 
In this section, we give a formal description of a deci­
sion tree and show how one can transform a decision 
tree into a set of goal-accessible worlds. Intuitively, 
both decision trees and goal-accessible worlds capture 
the desirable ends or outcomes of the decision prob­
lem, the different alternatives or choices available to 
the agent to achieve those ends, and the chance events 
controlled by nature. Note that this intuitive map­
ping is possible only because we have chosen to rep­
resent each possible world as a branching-time struc­
ture, rather than the more traditional model where 
each possible world is a linear-time structure [3]. Al­
though one may be able to define a transformation 
from decision trees to linear-time models, we believe 
that such a mapping would be less intuitive than the 
one illustrated here. 
The decision tree for our running example is given on 
the left hand side of Figure 3. Decision nodes are de­
noted by boxes and chance nodes by circles. The for­
mal definition of a decision tree is as follows: 
Definition 3 : A decision tree DT = <N, £, S, PS, 
P, U, <I>, lji, E> . ./11, is the union of all decision nodes 
V, all chance nodes C, and all terminal nodes T. <I> is 
the set of all propositional formulas, IJi is the set of all 
probabilistic state formulas (which includes the condi­
tional probability operator in addition to the standard 
logical operators), and E is the set of all primitive 
event types. £ <; V x ./11 x E is an event relation. S 
<; C x (V U T) x <I> is a chance relation. PS <; C x (V 
U T) x IJi is a probabilistic state relation. P: IJi ...... � 
is a probability function that maps probabilistic states 
to real numbers. U: T --> �is the payoff function that 
assigns to a terminal node a real number. 
Now we consider the transformation from decision 
trees to possible worlds. Given a decision tree, we 
start from the root node and traverse each arc. For 
each unique state labeled on an arc emanating from 
a chance node,3 we create a new decision tree that 
3Note that the decision tree is split with respect to the 
create( t, n, p) 
Case n is a decision node 
For all m such that £(n, m, e) 
create(t, m, p); 
Case n is a chance node 
For all s such that S(n, m, s) 
For all (u q) in remove(t, s, p) 
create(u, m, q); 
Case n is a terminal node 
return(t, p). 
remove(t, s, p) 
For all n, m such that S(n, m, s) and PS(n, m, r) 
collect( 
(t - S(n, m, s) - £(k, n, e) + £(k, m, e)), p.r)) 
Figure 2: Functions for Transformation 
is identical to the original tree except that (a) the 
chance node is removed and (b) the arc incident on 
the chance node is connected to the successor of the 
chance node. This process is carried out recursively 
until there are no chance nodes left. Each of the deci­
sion trees so obtained consists of only decision nodes 
and terminal nodes. Each one of these decision trees 
is then transformed into a possible world structure by 
appropriately renaming the relations. The payoff func­
tion is assigned to paths in a straightforward way, thus 
yielding a set of goal-accessible worlds. 
We obtain the probability distribution over the corre­
sponding belief worlds by associating with each de­
cision tree that is created a value o, which will fi­
nally correspond to the probability of a goal world. 
This probability is essentially the weighted product 
of all the chance nodes that a particular world repre­
sents. This probability distribution is finally passed 
back onto the corresponding belief-accessible worlds. 
The transformation is performed by two functions, 
create and remove, which are defined in Figure 2. 
We have assumed in the function remove that the 
chance node is connected by an arc from a decision 
node. This is true in all cases except when the chance 
node is the root node of the decision tree. We have also 
assumed that the chance states are named uniquely. 
The create function, when called with a given decision 
tree, its root node, and a probability value of one, will 
result in a set of decision trees with appropriate prob­
abilities. The final transformation from these multiple 
decision trees with no chance nodes to possible worlds 
is trivial and is given elsewhere [13]. Figure 3 gives the 
transformation for the running example. 
The possible worlds so formed are goal-accessible 
worlds. The probabilities associated with these worlds 
are the same as the probabilities of the decision trees 
chance states and not with respect to the chance nodes. 
This is important to avoid invalid goal worlds. 
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a=l 
P(Wioi)'C') = 0.571 P(Lo.oi)'C') = 0.429 
P(Winlno) = 0.276 P(Lonlno) = 0.724 
a= 0.42 
a=O.S8 
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Figure 3: Transformation from Decision Trees to Goal Worlds 
from which they are derived. Given our semantic con­
dition earlier that all goal-accessible worlds have corre­
sponding belief-accessible worlds, the probability dis­
tribution flows backwards to belief-accessible worlds. 
This transformation yields the following proposition: 
Proposition 1 : Given a decision tree DT we can 
create a possible worlds interpretation M such that the 
information given by the decision tree DT is satisfiable 
for a particular world y and time t in M. We shall 
denote this by transform(DT,<M,y,t>). 
5 DELIBERATION AND 
INTENTIONS 
Given a decision tree and the above transformation, 
an agent can make use of standard decision-theoretic 
techniques such as maximin or maximizing expected 
value to deliberate and decide the best plan of action. 
This best plan of action is what the agent commits to 
and adopts as an intention. 
To capture the process of decision theory deliberation, 
we introduce two generic functions, the value function, 
denoted by V, and the deliberation function, denoted 
by 8. The value function assigns a real-valued number 
to every node in the decision tree and the deliberation 
function chooses one or more best sequences of actions 
to perform at a given node. Both these functions will 
be parameterised on the particular deliberation proce-
dure used; i.e., maximin deliberation, maximizing the 
expected utility, or any other deliberation procedure. 
We shall use the operator ';' to denote sequencing of 
actions. 
First we consider the maximin approach. The value 
and deliberation functions for this approach is given 
in Figure 4. For the running example, the maximin 
deliberation function returns the set {No Poii;Rep, 
Poii;Rep}. 
Next we examine the principle of maximizing expected 
value. For decision nodes and terminal nodes, the 
value function and the deliberation function using the 
maxexpval principle are identical to the ones under 
the maximin principle. For chance nodes, the value 
and deliberation functions are defined as: 
V(maxexpval, n;) = L:{n,JPS(n,,n;,p;)} P(pj).V(nj) 
8(maxexpval, n;) = 
{ Sj ?; 8( maxexpval, ni) IS( n;, ni, Sj)} 
For the running example the above deliberation func­
tion returns { Poll;yes?;Sen, Poll;no ?;Rep}. Actions 
yes? and no? are used as conditional tests. 
Modifying the modal operator INTEND with a sub­
script that indicates the decision procedure used, we 
can state the following theorem which allows an agent 
to form intentions based on his deliberation. 
Theorem 1 : If an agent with a decision tree DT with 




V(maximin, n;) = maX{n;IC(n,,n;,e;)} V(n;) 
U(n;) 
if n; E C 
if n; E 'D 
if n; E T 
6(maximin, ni) = { 
{6(maximin, n;) I S(n;,n;,s;) and V(n;) = V(n;)} 
{e;;6(maximin,n;) I e(n;,n;,e;) and V(n;) = V(n;)} 
nil 
if n; E C 
if n; E 'D 
if n; E T 
Figure 4: Value and deliberation functions for maximin 
root node n and deliberation procedure d chooses as a 
best plan a sequence of actions a, i.e., a E 6{d, n), and 
the transformation is transform(DT, <M,y,t>) then 
M, y, t f: INTENDd(OPTIONAL(<>done(a))). 
To prove the above theorem, we need to define the 
process of deliberation within a possible-worlds model 
that generates intention-accessible worlds from a given 
set of goal-accessible and belief-accessible worlds. This 
definition is given elsewhere [13]. The set of intention­
accessible worlds generated by maxexpval deliberation 
is shown in F igure 1. The possible-worlds delibera­
tion can be shown to be equivalent to the decision 
tree deliberation [13]. This equivalence together with 
Proposition 1 establishes the above theorem. 
Note that the maximin deliberation function always 
commits to a particular branch emanating from a 
chance node; namely, the branch that leads to a min­
imum value node. This means that 6 for maximin 
can always return a sequence of actions without being 
conditional on any state information. However, this is 
not true in the case of maxexpval deliberation because 
each chance node is a weighted sum of all its branches. 
The actions thus have to be conditional on the state of 
the world. Thus maximin deliberation yields uncon­
ditional intentions and maxexpval deliberation results 
in conditional intentions. 
For the example under discussion, we have the fol­
lowing unconditional maximin intentions and condi­
tional maxexpval intentions: (a) the agent intends by 
maximin that, in all future paths he will stand for 
the House of representatives, i.e., INTENDmaximin (IN­
EVITABLE (<>done(Rep))); (b) the agent intends by 
maxexpval that, in all future paths in which he has 
carried out a poll and the majority have answered yes, 
he would stand for the Senate, i.e., INTENDmaxexpval 
(INEVITABLE(<> (done(Po/0 A yes ::J <>done(Sen)))); 
and (c) the agent intends by maxexpval that, in 
all future paths inwhich he has carried out a poll 
and the majority have answered no, he would stand 
for the House, i.e., INTENDmaxexpval (INEVITABLE(<> 
(done(Po/0 1\ no ::J <)done(Rep)))). 
So far, we have discussed how deliberation leads to the 
formation of conditional and unconditional intentions. 
As discussed in the introduction, intentions play the 
two important roles of posing decision problems for 
deliberation and constraining the options open for de­
liberation. The decision tree and the decision prob­
lem that we until now have taken for granted could 
have been generated because of a top-level intention 
of Phil to be rich and famous. In other words, a 
prior intention of the form INTEND(OPTION AL<>(rich 
A famous)) followed by means-end reasoning could 
have resulted in the decision tree to conduct a poll 
and run for the House or Senate seat. Also, if Phil 
had the prior intention to stand for a Senate seat, i.e., 
if INTEND(INEVITABLE<>done(Sen)) were true, then 
the decision tree would be one without any alternatives 
for standing for the House. Thus, future-directed in­
tentions constrain the decision problem that has to be 
considered. 
We believe that the formalism we have presented here 
is general enough to cover a wide range of decision 
problems. The transformation and equivalence estab­
lished in this paper should help one to choose the ap­
propriate representation for the appropriate purpose, 
making use of the results of one representation within 
the other. For example, one could operate within a 
possible-worlds BDI framework for reasoning about 
the interaction of beliefs, goals, and intentions, and 
how they change with time [15], shift to a decision tree 
representation for deliberation, and then come back to 
the possible-worlds framework for reasoning about the 
intentions so formed. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines one of the important philosoph­
ical aspects of Bratman's theory of rational agency; 
namely, that deliberation leads to the formation of 
intentions. We have presented a powerful branching­
time possible-worlds model for reasoning about beliefs, 
goals, intentions, actions, time, probabilities, and pay­
offs, and provided a transformation from decision trees 
to structures in this model. We have also shown how 
the deliberation procedure used determines the inten­
tions adopted by the agent. This formal model of de­
liberation within a BDI-architecture is one of the main 
contributions of this paper. Previous work on formal­
izations of BDI-architectures [3, 12, 15] does not ad-
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dress this issue. 
Recent work in real-time reasoning has vigorously pur­
sued the use of decision-theoretic techniques. Russell 
and Wefald [16] treat computations themselves as ac­
tions, with appropriate utilities. These computations 
have to be chosen from among a number of different 
alternatives and decision theory is used to choose the 
best action or computation. This facilitates meta-level 
reasoning. Haddawy and Hanks [9] explore the rela­
tionships between symbolic goals and numeric utili­
ties. In particular, they address the problem of build­
ing utility functions. However, neither approach con­
siders the role of decision theory in the formation of 
intentions, which is the primary focus of this paper. 
Fagin and Halpern [5] combine reasoning about knowl­
edge and probabilities by explicitly introducing prob­
ability formulas. Haddawy [8] introduces reasoning 
about probabilities in a branching time model by con­
sidering a world to be a future path. The work pre­
sented here deals with both future paths in a branching 
time model and different possible worlds in the epis­
temic sense. It also introduces explicit reasoning about 
payoffs and treats payoffs as values the agent places 
on his future paths within a goal-accessible world. 
Thus it builds on the existing tradition by combining a 
possible-worlds BDI framework with decision-theoretic 
deliberation and explicit reasoning about probabilities 
and payoffs. 
Our future work in this area will focus on the role 
of intentions in deliberation and reconsideration. We 
aim to analyze the need for rational agents to recon­
sider intentions and when they should carry out such 
reconsideration. 
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